Why striving for moral perfection makes you a worse human
In 1982, philosopher Susan Wolf pointed out a hidden flaw in traditional ethics: being morally perfect makes you terribly boring. A "moral saint" whose every waking moment serves others leaves no time to appreciate humor, master the piano, or enjoy good food. Wolf argued that a life devoted entirely to moral goodness lacks the rich, non-moral virtues that make human life meaningful and complete.
The Paradox of the Moral Ideal
In modern ethical philosophy, goodness is commonly treated as a goal without an upper ceiling. If helping a neighbor is good, devoting every weekend to community service is better, and dedicating every waking hour to relieving global suffering would seem to be the ultimate achievement. Most ethical traditions, whether focusing on minimizing harm or maximizing general happiness, operate on the assumption that a person ought to become as morally upright as possible.
In 1982, philosopher Susan Wolf challenged this basic assumption in her landmark paper 'Moral Saints.' Wolf argued that moral perfection, when treated as an all-consuming life goal, is not actually an attractive human ideal. If a person were to succeed completely in becoming a moral saint—someone whose every action is oriented toward doing the greatest possible good—the resulting life would be strangely hollow, lacking many of the qualities that make human beings interesting, capable, and complete.
Two Portraits of Moral Sainthood
To examine how extreme morality affects human character, Wolf divided moral saints into two distinct archetypes: the 'Loving Saint' and the 'Rational Saint.' The Loving Saint represents a utilitarian ideal of goodness. For this person, personal happiness is entirely fused with the happiness of others. They do not feel as though they are making sacrifices because their only genuine joy comes from feeding the hungry, caring for the sick, or alleviating distress.
The Rational Saint, by contrast, aligns more closely with a Kantian model of duty. This person still possesses normal human desires for personal comfort, prestige, or leisure, but systematically suppresses them out of a rigorous commitment to moral duty. They do good not because it gives them direct pleasure, but because they believe it is strictly required by moral law.